Published Research
Bad Apples and Broken Ladders: A Pragmatic Defence of Causal Decision Theory (PDF)
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming)
While pragmatic arguments are traditionally seen as supporting decision theory, recent discussions suggest the possibility of pragmatic arguments against this theory. I respond to two such arguments and clarify what it would take for arguments of this sort to succeed.
Supererogation and Sequence (PDF)(PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Claire Benn
Synthese (Forthcoming)
Morally supererogatory acts are those that go above and beyond the call of duty. More specifically: they are acts that, on any individual occasion, are good to do and also both permissible to do and permissible to refrain from doing. We challenge the way in which discussions of supererogation typically consider our choices and actions in isolation. Instead we consider sequences of supererogatory acts and omissions and show that some such sequences are themselves problematic. This gives rise to the following puzzle: what problem can we have with a sequences of actions if each individual act or omission is itself permissible? In this paper, we develop a response to this question, by exploring whether solutions analogous to those proposed in the rational choice literature are available in the case of supererogatory sequences. Our investigation leads us to the view that making sense of the supererogatory requires accepting that there are global moral norms that apply to sequences of acts alongside the local moral norms that apply to individual acts.
The Rationally Supererogatory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Claire Benn
Mind (2020), Vol. 129, Issue: 515
The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, of actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation. That is, we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case that we are rationally required to carry out the act. We argue that a response to this ‘paradox’ can be found by reflecting on normative conflicts: cases where what is best according to some normative domain is different to what is best according to some other normative domain.
Intentions and Instability: A Defence of Causal Decision Theory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2020), Vol. 177, Issue: 3
Andy Egan has recently presented a prominent objection to causal decision theory (CDT). However, in this paper, I argue that this objection fails if CDT’s proponent accepts the plausible view that decision-theoretic options are intentions. This result both provides a defence of CDT against a prominent objection and highlights the importance of resolving the nature of decision-theoretic options.
Decision Theoretic Pluralism: Causation, Evidence and Indeterminacy (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
The Philosophical Quarterly (2018), Vol. 68, Issue: 273
The debate between proponents of causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT) typically proceeds via the introduction of cases where one of these theories appears to give the right guidance and the other appears to give problematic guidance. Typically, such cases are then taken to provide grounds to accept the successful theory and reject the unsuccessful one. However, in light of the fact that some of these cases support EDT and others support CDT, various people have explored the possibility that both CDT and EDT capture part of the truth about rationality. In this paper, I defend this sort of decision-theoretic pluralism. I then go on to argue for a specific form of such pluralism. On this view, EDT and CDT corresponding to different sharpenings of a vague notion of rational permissibility.
Indeterminate Permissibility and Choiceworthy Options (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2018), Vol. 175, Issue: 7
Various people have claimed that some cases involve indeterminate permissibility. However, it’s unclear what guidance one can take away from this fact: are indeterminately permissible options choiceworthy and if so when? In this paper, I present a counterexample that undermines two existing responses to this question and I then present two alternative solutions that avoid this counterexample.
Richness and Rationality: Causal Decision Theory and the WAR Argument (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Synthese (2017), Vol. 195, Issue: 1
Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the ”why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others (including David Lewis and Terry Horgan) take WAR to fail to resolve the debate over CDT’s adequacy. In this paper, I will defend this second view: WAR does not resolve the debate at hand but instead leads to deadlock. Then, in the second half of this paper, I will show that this deadlock is not broken by a recent variant on WAR due to Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden. Not only does this result have implications for the debate over CDT’s adequacy but this discussion also casts light on the broader success/rationality link.
The Pauper's Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2016), Vol. 173, Issue: 6
In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort pose serious problems for causal decision theory (the version of decision theory championed by Lewis and many others). In this paper, I will argue that these problems can be overcome: scenarios of this sort do not pose fatal problems for this theory as there are versions of CDT that reason appropriately in these cases. However, I will also argue that such cases push us toward a particular version of CDT developed by Wlodek Rabinowicz.
Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Daniel Cohen and Toby Handfield
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2014), Vol. 92, Issue: 3
Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (Forthcoming)
While pragmatic arguments are traditionally seen as supporting decision theory, recent discussions suggest the possibility of pragmatic arguments against this theory. I respond to two such arguments and clarify what it would take for arguments of this sort to succeed.
Supererogation and Sequence (PDF)(PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Claire Benn
Synthese (Forthcoming)
Morally supererogatory acts are those that go above and beyond the call of duty. More specifically: they are acts that, on any individual occasion, are good to do and also both permissible to do and permissible to refrain from doing. We challenge the way in which discussions of supererogation typically consider our choices and actions in isolation. Instead we consider sequences of supererogatory acts and omissions and show that some such sequences are themselves problematic. This gives rise to the following puzzle: what problem can we have with a sequences of actions if each individual act or omission is itself permissible? In this paper, we develop a response to this question, by exploring whether solutions analogous to those proposed in the rational choice literature are available in the case of supererogatory sequences. Our investigation leads us to the view that making sense of the supererogatory requires accepting that there are global moral norms that apply to sequences of acts alongside the local moral norms that apply to individual acts.
The Rationally Supererogatory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Claire Benn
Mind (2020), Vol. 129, Issue: 515
The notion of supererogation—going above and beyond the call of duty—is typically discussed in a moral context. However, in this paper we argue for the existence of rationally supererogatory actions: that is, of actions that go above and beyond the call of rational duty. In order to establish the existence of such actions, we first need to overcome the so-called paradox of supererogation. That is, we need to provide some explanation for why, if some act is rationally optimal, it is not the case that we are rationally required to carry out the act. We argue that a response to this ‘paradox’ can be found by reflecting on normative conflicts: cases where what is best according to some normative domain is different to what is best according to some other normative domain.
Intentions and Instability: A Defence of Causal Decision Theory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2020), Vol. 177, Issue: 3
Andy Egan has recently presented a prominent objection to causal decision theory (CDT). However, in this paper, I argue that this objection fails if CDT’s proponent accepts the plausible view that decision-theoretic options are intentions. This result both provides a defence of CDT against a prominent objection and highlights the importance of resolving the nature of decision-theoretic options.
Decision Theoretic Pluralism: Causation, Evidence and Indeterminacy (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
The Philosophical Quarterly (2018), Vol. 68, Issue: 273
The debate between proponents of causal decision theory (CDT) and evidential decision theory (EDT) typically proceeds via the introduction of cases where one of these theories appears to give the right guidance and the other appears to give problematic guidance. Typically, such cases are then taken to provide grounds to accept the successful theory and reject the unsuccessful one. However, in light of the fact that some of these cases support EDT and others support CDT, various people have explored the possibility that both CDT and EDT capture part of the truth about rationality. In this paper, I defend this sort of decision-theoretic pluralism. I then go on to argue for a specific form of such pluralism. On this view, EDT and CDT corresponding to different sharpenings of a vague notion of rational permissibility.
Indeterminate Permissibility and Choiceworthy Options (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2018), Vol. 175, Issue: 7
Various people have claimed that some cases involve indeterminate permissibility. However, it’s unclear what guidance one can take away from this fact: are indeterminately permissible options choiceworthy and if so when? In this paper, I present a counterexample that undermines two existing responses to this question and I then present two alternative solutions that avoid this counterexample.
Richness and Rationality: Causal Decision Theory and the WAR Argument (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Synthese (2017), Vol. 195, Issue: 1
Causal decision theory (CDT) is one of our most prominent theories of rational choice and the ”why ain’cha rich?” argument (WAR) is one of the most prominent objections to this theory. According to WAR, CDT is not an adequate theory of rational choice because it leads agents to make decisions that foreseeably leave them less well off than agents that decide in some other manner. Some philosophers take WAR to decisively undermine CDT. On the other hand, others (including David Lewis and Terry Horgan) take WAR to fail to resolve the debate over CDT’s adequacy. In this paper, I will defend this second view: WAR does not resolve the debate at hand but instead leads to deadlock. Then, in the second half of this paper, I will show that this deadlock is not broken by a recent variant on WAR due to Caspar Hare and Brian Hedden. Not only does this result have implications for the debate over CDT’s adequacy but this discussion also casts light on the broader success/rationality link.
The Pauper's Problem: Chance, Foreknowledge and Causal Decision Theory (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Philosophical Studies (2016), Vol. 173, Issue: 6
In a letter to Wlodek Rabinowicz, David Lewis introduced a decision scenario that he described as “much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb Problems”. This scenario, which involves an agent with foreknowledge of the outcome of some chance process, has received little subsequent attention. However, in one of the small number of discussions of such cases, Huw Price's Causation, Chance and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence it has been argued that cases of this sort pose serious problems for causal decision theory (the version of decision theory championed by Lewis and many others). In this paper, I will argue that these problems can be overcome: scenarios of this sort do not pose fatal problems for this theory as there are versions of CDT that reason appropriately in these cases. However, I will also argue that such cases push us toward a particular version of CDT developed by Wlodek Rabinowicz.
Decision Theory for Agents with Incomplete Preferences (PDF) (PUBLISHED VERSION)
Co-authored with Daniel Cohen and Toby Handfield
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2014), Vol. 92, Issue: 3
Orthodox decision theory gives no advice to agents who hold two goods to be incommensurate in value because such agents will have incomplete preferences. According to standard treatments, rationality requires complete preferences, so such agents are irrational. Experience shows, however, that incomplete preferences are ubiquitous in ordinary life. In this paper, we aim to do two things: (1) show that there is a good case for revising decision theory so as to allow it to apply non-vacuously to agents with incomplete preferences, and (2) to identify one substantive criterion that any such non-standard decision theory must obey. Our criterion, Competitiveness, is a weaker version of a dominance principle. Despite its modesty, Competitiveness is incompatible with prospectism, a recently developed decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences. We spend the final part of the paper showing why Competitiveness should be retained, and prospectism rejected.